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Educating for Justice in a Secular Age:
Charles Taylor on the Moral Roots of Identity and Belief
Daniel P. Justin
Boston College
(Daniel.P.Justin@gmail.com)
Abstract
More than forty years after the Society of Jesus first articulated an inextricable link between the service of
faith and the promotion of justice, a growing challenge today for Jesuit colleges and universities is to
demonstrate what (if anything) faith adds to the struggle for human dignity and rights. Charles Taylor offers
one of the most expansive views of our secular age, arguing that the cultural shifts are moral in nature.
Ultimately, our secular age is one in which we are able to imagine human fullness and flourishing with no
reference to the transcendent. This article employs the moral framework that Taylor develops in Sources of the
Self as an interpretive lens for A Secular Age and identifies new challenges and opportunities for justice
education embedded within our contemporary context. Ultimately, sustaining our moral and social
commitments is difficult (if not impossible) without engaging our deeper moral and spiritual sources.
Introduction
2015 marked the fortieth anniversary of the
Society of Jesus’ 32nd General Congregation,
whose fourth decree articulated the mission today
in terms of an inextricable link between the
service of faith and the promotion of justice.1 This
document amplified a profound shift in the
mission of Jesuit higher education that began a
year earlier with Pedro Arrupe’s call for colleges
and universities that form men (and women) for
others.2 In the years since, this declaration has
remained a radical challenge not just for Jesuits
but also for the institutions sponsored by the
Society. There have been important developments
and commentaries in the years since. In particular,
Peter-Hans Kolvenbach’s demand twenty-five
years later that the measure of any Jesuit
institution is who the students become, and he
called for “a well-educated solidarity…[that] is
learned through ‘contact’ rather than ‘concepts.’”3
The radical character of the fourth decree persists,
but the context has shifted in recent years.
Undoubtedly, there are still many that hold on to
privatized or other-worldly notions of faith for
whom the demands of justice remain (at best)
secondary concerns. Yet increasingly,
communicating to our students the necessity of
working for justice is not our principal challenge;
it’s helping them to recognize what committed
faith adds to these labors. As recent Pew studies

demonstrate, religiously unaffiliated “nones” are
on the rise and now constitute 36% of collegeaged emerging adults.4 At the same time, they are
the most politically progressive and tolerant
generational cohort in the country.5 For many
students, a commitment to the promotion of
justice is easy, at least in theory. The question is
why the service of faith is a necessary corollary.
Formulating an institutional response to this
emerging trend begins by properly understanding
our contemporary context. Few recent texts have
contributed more to our understanding of this
new secular milieu than Charles Taylor’s A Secular
Age.6 Crucially, Taylor shifts the entire inquiry
from the more readily apparent declines in the
public influence or private practice of religion,
examining instead the contemporary conditions of
belief. How is it, he asks, that whereas non-belief
was virtually impossible 500 years ago, we have
come to a point today in which theistic belief is
recognized as but one of many life options – and
frequently one of the more difficult? Getting to
this point was a creative achievement of
modernity. Secularism is not what is left once
science had disproved our old mythologies and
superstitions. Far from a pre-determined or
inevitable stage in western history, the
secularization narrative Taylor offers is in his
words a “zig-zag account…full of unintended
consequences.”7 Indeed, many of cultural shifts
that Taylor identifies were Christian in origin.
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Taylor’s insights (and indeed his framing of the
entire question) have prompted a flurry of
responses in the form of conferences, symposia,
and edited volumes. They also earned the author
the Templeton Prize in 2007. Not every
commentator accepts his take on our secular age,
but his text is necessary reading for anyone who
wishes to be a part of the ongoing conversation.
My hope for this essay is not principally to offer a
synopsis of the historical transitions outlined in A
Secular Age, however.8 Rather, I wish to highlight
the ways in which, from Taylor’s perspective, the
growing commitment to justice and declining rates
of religious participation find a common source in
our moral imaginations. I will further argue that if
Taylor’s read on our contemporary situation is
correct, opportunities for sustained contact with
the poor and marginalized through experiential
education and service-learning programs must be
a central to Jesuit higher education’s ongoing
commitment to the indissoluble link between
justice and faith.
I will do so by suggesting an interpretive lens
through which we may best understand the
driving forces behind modern secularism – a lens
that Taylor develops in his earlier work. According
to the author, secularity is not the gradual and
inevitable eclipse of religion by the forces of
science and instrumental rationality. Rather, it is
the result of modern shifts in our moral
imagination: how we envision ourselves, our
world, and the good life. Stated plainly: our secular
age is one in which it is possible to imagine and
pursue human flourishing in ways that require no
reference to the transcendent. This becomes clear
when we read A Secular Age through Taylor’s
earlier texts, particularly Sources of the Self.9 Such a
perspective places the ethical at the center of
today’s theological enterprise, and presents unique
challenges and opportunities for those engaged in
peace and justice education at Jesuit colleges and
universities. After sketching the framework of
moral identity that Taylor develops in Sources of the
Self, I hope to offer insights for how educators,
particularly through service-learning, can inform
and assist students as they negotiate authentic
expressions of their identity and beliefs.

Mapping Our Moral Identities:
Life Goods, Hypergoods, and Constitutive
Goods
The task that Taylor assigns himself in Sources of the
Self is immense. In this work he seeks to discern
and trace the emergence of the modern self: how
we have come to understand and locate ourselves
in the world in the particular ways that we do
today. Our identity as modern individuals, our
radical reflexivity, and our individualized quest to
make meaning of our lives is a unique
phenomenon in western history. While there are
many facets contributing to this vision of self,
Taylor advances a primarily moral framework
sustaining our sense of identity. The modern
“sources of the self” are more ethical than
ontological.
Taylor’s conviction is that our identity and how
we envision the world are inescapably linked to
our values and our conception of the good. Taylor
grounds his proposal in our common experience
of what he terms “strong evaluations” of “life
goods”, which “involve discriminations of right or
wrong, better or worse, higher or lower, which are
not rendered valid by our own desires,
inclinations, or choices, but rather stand
independent of these and offer standards by
which they can be judged.”10 Within his definition
of these strong evaluations are several important
components that contribute to his notion of the
self, and ultimately, of secularization. First, it is
necessary to recognize that not all choices are
genuine strong evaluations. Our preferences for
musical acts or ice cream flavors are exactly that:
preferences. While we may feel passionately about
these opinions, we nevertheless recognize them as
such. We do not hold others accountable for
failing to share our tastes in such matters
regardless of how much we may disagree.
Strong evaluations, on the other hand, are those
moral intuitions that are perceived to have
grounding in external or objective criteria. They
are recognitions of goods that are beyond us and
that attract us to them. More than the questions of
duty and transgression that typically fall under the
auspices of morality, these are judgments about
what it is that makes life meaningful or fulfilling:
our families, careers, and passions. In many of our
more foundational choices, we do indeed believe
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that some values or ways of being are superior to
others. We view particular ways of living or acting
in the world as more praiseworthy than others.
Similarly, our disagreement with the choices of
others extends beyond opinion and preference.
This disapproval is not limited to situations of
oppression or injustice. One may live a quiet and
solitary life in which she has done no real harm to
others or transgressed any serious moral
injunction; yet, to declare her life meaningless is to
hold her accountable to a standard beyond
personal preference (and to issue a particularly
grave condemnation in our contemporary age).
Thus, these evaluations have both a descriptive
and prescriptive role. We evaluate objects and
actions as we perceive them, but also discern what
goods are worthy of pursuit.
According to Taylor, we make such evaluations on
a regular basis, both about others and ourselves.
Often, however, the roots or foundations of these
judgments remain largely unarticulated. We
experience them as moral instincts or gut
reactions. Our moral sensibilities are outraged
when we witness blatant acts of oppression or
neglect, and likewise we experience a sense of
wonder and humble awe when witnessing a life of
heroic virtue. For naturalists and sociobiologists,
common adversaries in Taylor’s writings, the
seemingly instinctual response is evidence of
irrational subjectivism with no ontological basis.
Our articulated justifications for these judgments
are considered, “so much froth, nonsense from a
bygone age.”11 Ironically, this refusal to
acknowledge the ontological becomes an ontology
of its own for the naturalist, but this is getting
ahead of the story.
When we articulate our selfhood, it is these life
goods that give us our sense of the values and
priorities that make us who we are. We map our
identity in terms of where we stand relative to
those objects we treasure. Our significant
relationships, creative self-expression, and
participation in meaningful projects give us a
sense of moral location, and we would be lost
without these landmarks. Such strong evaluations
compose the moral frameworks that give meaning
to our lives and endeavors. Far from static, these
judgments fluctuate in both content and
significance. Moreover, we perceive ourselves as
growing closer to or farther from particular goods

over the course of our lifetime. As we strive
toward these sources of meaning, we are also
aware that we risk failing in our endeavor.12
When forced to explain or justify our moral
judgments, or when we encounter a conflict of
goods in our lived experience, we draw on deeper
values and higher orders of worth. Behind our
appraisals of particular actions and modes of
being, there are more foundational goods that
order strong evaluations and establish a hierarchy
of commitments. Our appreciation for countless
particular goods coalesces around ideals such as
justice, honor, or self-expression. “Hypergoods”
such as these provide the vantage point from
which life goods are “weighed, judged, decided
about.”13 When we formulate an articulation of
the good life, our starting point is these
hypergoods. Similarly, societal debates and culture
wars frequently occur along the fault lines of
competing hypergoods, and hence competing
moralities. Even when there is an agreement about
some set of goods, their proper ordering can be
source of division (honoring patriotism versus
universal human rights, for example).
Taylor believes that societies can reject and
transcend inadequate hypergoods, as evidenced by
Plato’s assault on Greek warrior ethic, but
remnants will nevertheless remain. In a pluralistic
society such as ours, we must not only account for
the fragments of past ethical systems, but must
also negotiate the multiple living traditions that
remain active and vibrant. Such deliberations are
not accomplished through abstraction, but by
directly appealing to the moral intuitions of
agents. Echoing Alasdair MacIntyre, moral
deliberation about the proper ordering of
hypergoods occurs in conversations among rival
traditions.14 An interlocutor must demonstrate
why attachment to one particular set of goods
over another facilitates a more meaningful human
life: “You will only convince me by changing my
reading of my moral experience, and in particular
my reading of my life story, of the transitions I
have lived through – or perhaps refused to live
through.”15 Systematic abstraction and universal
declarations may be appealing, but they are a
distortion of the actual ways that individuals
engage in practical reasoning. Conversion begins
with learning to retell our stories.
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Naming the goods that motivate our lives is a
central concern for Taylor. Without such
articulation, life remains unexamined; moral
conversations and deliberations are impossible.
When one must give further account of even these
hypergoods that inform our vision of a
meaningful life, we will in turn articulate their
ultimate source: our “constitutive good.”16 This is
more than yet another layer of evaluations; rather,
it is the source of all life goods, and the font of
goodness itself. Plato’s ideal of the Good is a
helpful point of departure for investigating
Taylor’s scheme.17 Wisdom, for Plato, is rooted in
a vision of and love for the rational ordering of
the cosmos. In other words, the Good for Plato
has both a moral and an ontological dimension; it
is a perception of how things are and an affective
desiring for that reality. The Good is
“constitutive,” to use Taylor’s vocabulary, because
it is the source for all subsequent goods and
values, and for reality itself. Further, it is love for
this Good that empowers us to act morally in the
world. The Good, for Plato, is both the source
and the goal of the moral life.
Taylor does not pigeonhole all other traditions
into Plato’s framework, but he does perceive a
similar dynamic at work in other mature moral
theories. In each, there is a strong relationship
between the world as such and the goods that
ought to be pursued. Thus, for example, even
materialistic Marxists proclaim an ontology that
envisions history as an inevitable progression
toward liberation. So too, secular ecologists today
have their own perception of the world and our
proper place in it. For Christians, particularly as
inheritors of Augustine’s Platonism, God is the
constitutive good. God is the source of the
rational ordering of the cosmos – the way things
are. Similarly, through prayer and closer affiliation
with the divine, we are empowered to act morally
within this cosmos, thus bringing us closer to
God’s reign. The constitutive good, therefore, is a
closed circle, defining our comprehension of
reality and our vision of the telos. Through
modernity, it is not so much that this general
moral framework has changed, but rather its
content has. The life goods and constitutive goods
that we define and value are now secular and
immanent.

Before exploring this evolution, however, it is
necessary to consider Taylor’s link between the
good and identity in greater detail. Who we are
and what we value are entirely intertwined in
Taylor’s work, so much so that he never treats one
without addressing the other. Thus the
progression presented here is artificial, though
nevertheless helpful in understanding Taylor’s
project. Identity begins with the strong evaluations
that we make. This needs no elaborate defense,
but should rather be readily apparent. When asked
to describe ourselves or give an account of our
lives, we necessarily make judgments about what
merit mentioning and what does not. We decide
which relationships and activities are more central
to our self-understanding and which are
peripheral. It is who we are as a mother, artist, or
citizen that shapes the core of our character.
These roles are not merely descriptive, but valueladen.
This link between the good and identity continues
through Taylor’s hypergoods. Even beyond our
judgments and the roles that we play, our
uniqueness is rooted in the overarching goods that
order our lives: belief in concepts such as fidelity
or service. Ultimately, our identities are grounded
in our constitutive good. The source of our
strength and goal of our efforts is the defining
characteristic of our identity. These are not static
realities, however. As we have already seen, our
ordering and judgments about the good can
change over time. What was once the overriding
goal of our lives can be exposed as a false idol or
simply decline when we are drawn to higher
values. Our roles change and different aspects of
our identity come to the fore.
Critically for Taylor, as self-interpreting animals
our identity is evaluated in terms of how we
measure against the goods that we value. Whether
we believe ourselves to be moral or not, these
hypergoods and the constitutive good provide the
dimensions for our self-evaluation. We define our
existence not merely by what we value, but by the
degree to which we are approaching or regressing
from these ideals. The narrative of our lives is the
journey toward or away from our ultimate values.
Our self-worth is rooted in our evaluation of how
we are doing:

Jesuit Higher Education 5(1): 21-33 (2016)

24

Daniel P. Justin: Educating for Justice in a Secular Age
Whereas I naturally want to be well
placed in relation to all and any of the
goods I recognize and to be moving
towards rather than away from them, my
direction in relation to this good has a
crucial importance. Just because my
orientation to it is essential to my identity,
so the recognition that my life is turned
away from it, or can never approach it,
would be devastating and insufferable…
Symmetrically, the assurance that I am
turned towards this good gives me a sense
of wholeness, of fulness [sic] of being as a
person or self, that nothing else can.18
This centrality of self-interpretation puts Taylor at
odds with deterministic theories that explain
behavior with no reference to identity.19 It is not
simply the cultural or economic context in which
we find ourselves that shapes our selfunderstanding. Rather, it is how we articulate the
narrative of our striving. Yet, this selfinterpretation should not be confused with
absolute autonomy. We seek to make meaning out
of the stories of our lives, but the tools with which
we work are largely provided by our historical and
cultural context. When Taylor speaks of the moral
frameworks or horizons (he uses the two
interchangeably) that shape our identity, he
recognizes that we are never more than co-authors
of these structures: “People may see their identity
as defined partly by some moral or spiritual
commitment, say as a Catholic, or an anarchist…
What they are saying by this is not just that they
are strongly attached to this spiritual view or
background; rather it is that this provides the
frame within which they can determine where they
stand on questions of what is good, or
worthwhile, or admirable, or of value.”20
Taylor describes these frameworks as inescapable,
with two implications. First, he holds that it is
impossible to ever step out of a framework
completely. While one set of goods may give way
to another, escaping the dynamic itself is
impossible. To do so would be to abandon
precisely what makes us human (i.e., selfinterpreting animals).21 To be without a
framework is to suffer a crisis of identity, to lose
one’s location in the world. Yet, these frames are
likewise inescapable in the sense that they are
constantly being handed on and formed by our

larger social network and culture. Who we are
begins with what narratives and practices have
shaped our values. As Ruth Abbey observes,
“When all the features of an individual’s selfinterpretation are aggregated this might amount to
something unique, but this interpretation always
points beyond the individual to the wider society
and culture to which she belongs. This is because
the array of linguistic, intellectual, emotional, and
aesthetic resources available for interpreting
oneself are furnished by one’s culture.”22 We can
only make do with the tools and resources we
have been given, though they may be limited and
fallible. Our culture may both guide and deceive
us. Though we can critically engage these sources,
we only do so from a rival perspective.
Identity, Belief, and Fullness in a Secular Age
Taylor’s account of our secular age is rooted in the
gradual shifting of the moral frameworks and
social imaginaries that constitute our sense of self
and world. In Sources of the Self, Taylor identifies
three shifts in our moral imagination that
profoundly influence the modern understanding
of the self. The first is a growing appreciation for
the inner depths of self: the Cartesian mind
disengages from an embodied existence and later,
with wonder and awe, we begin to perceive the
limitless and mysterious abyss within each one of
us. Plumbing and expressing these inner depths
becomes a modern moral imperative. Second, and
largely through the contributions of the
Reformation, our modern period has witnessed
the abolition of higher and lower callings in life.
Ordinary life and the focus on daily routines of
production and reproduction emerge as moral
ideal. It is no longer what we do that matters, but
the spirit with which we do it. Or, as the Puritans
aptly summarize, “God loveth adverbs.” The third
modern shift is toward nature as a moral source.
We find empowerment by accessing the forces of
nature in the world and ourselves. Yet by this
time, nature (both externally and within) becomes
viewed as entirely disenchanted and mechanistic, a
closed system with no ongoing contact with the
divine.
Over time, our modern sense of self was formed
through the allure, challenge, and reactions against
these new moral sources. It is not difficult to
perceive the influence this new understanding of
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inner depths, ordinary life, and nature has had on
our moral identities. They remain central to our
articulations of the good life. We can also begin to
recognize the effects this moral vision has had on
our sense of the transcendent. This is a vision of
human flourishing that has little need of, and little
room for, a personal God.
Shifting our attention to A Secular Age, Taylor
synthesizes and expands this moral framework as
he develops his notion of fullness, an idea that he
introduces in the following way:
Somewhere, in some activity, or
condition, lies a fullness, a richness; that
is, in that place… life is fuller, richer,
deeper, more worth while, more
admirable, more what it should be. This is
perhaps a place of power: we often
experience this as deeply moving, as
inspiring. Perhaps this sense of fullness is
something we just catch glimpses of from
afar off; we have the powerful intuition of
what fullness would be, were we to be in
that condition… of peace or wholeness;
or able to act on that level, of integrity or
generosity or abandonment or selfforgetfulness.23
Like Taylor’s concept of constitutive goods, these
moments of fullness orient our identity. We
understand ourselves in terms of how we relate to
them, even if they are only imagined or
experienced as an absence or loss of something we
once knew. Our daily routines find a deeper
meaning when we believe that we are slowly
progressing toward some vision of flourishing.
This notion of fullness largely encapsulates how
Taylor frames his notion of constitutive goods in
Sources of the Self. There is a similar dynamic of
something beyond us both drawing us in and
sending us forward. It is not only a moment of
heightened awareness, but an ideal around which
we structure our lives. When we are removed or
withdrawing away from this good, we know that
something is amiss. In the Christian tradition,
whose constitutive good is God, genuine fullness,
the ultimate telos of human life, is always beyond
our temporal lives and finite possibilities. Indeed,
it may even demand that we sacrifice a degree of
flourishing on Earth, a proposal that strikes the

secular humanist as anti-human and selfdestructive. This sense of a transcendent fullness
forms a bare, pragmatic definition of religion for
Taylor, at least within western civilization.24
Because Taylor is not concerned with institutional
religion in the public sphere or as a set of
practices, this “cowardly” definition of religion
allows Taylor to hone in on the crux of disbelief in
our contemporary society.
Defining religion as a vision of fullness found in
the transcendent establishes a series of binaries by
which Taylor outlines the contours of
contemporary secularism. Against the
transcendent, the secularist embraces a notion of
fullness that is grounded entirely within the
immanent. In a similar manner, Taylor draws a
distinction between finding one’s moral source
from within or without.25 As he identified in
Sources of the Self, Taylor holds that the modern
identity finds wonder and mystery within his or
her own depths of self. Our moral strength and
direction comes from our inner hidden nature. As
it became increasingly possible to envision
flourishing with no referent to transcendent
realities, theistic belief became superfluous and
optional. Hence Taylor’s thesis:
I would like to claim that the coming of
modern secularity in my sense has been
coterminous with the rise of a society in
which for the first time in history a purely
self-sufficient humanism came to be a
widely available option. I mean by this a
humanism accepting no final goals
beyond human flourishing, nor any
allegiance to anything else beyond this
flourishing. Of no previous society was
this true.26
The story of secularism is the story of the
emergence of an entirely immanent vision of
human flourishing. The great irony that Taylor
identifies is the degree to which this shift was
driven by Christian motivations.
Taylor explores many of the attempts to navigate
this new pluralistic arena, particularly from
positions of unbelief. Once again, to consider each
of these channels is beyond the scope of this
paper. A few general insights, however, set the
stage for considering the implications of and
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response to Taylor’s project from the perspective
of Jesuit higher education. As previously
mentioned, Taylor resists any secularism narrative
in which science gradually disproves religious
superstition. The naturalist position requires
unfounded presuppositions of their own, and any
functional life must include some leaps of faith.
Further, it is possible to abandon certain images of
God that have proven unreliable without
jettisoning faith all together. Taylor believes that
significant experiences and phenomena have the
capacity to be spun in either direction. Those who
believe will find evidence for their belief, while
those who resist find ample proof of their own
position. Our secular age is not a story of
subtraction, and renewed belief will not be the
product of intellectual proofs and deductive
reasoning alone.
Still, Taylor presses his case further. While he does
not offer a substantive apologetic for theistic
belief, he does raise several questions concerning
the limits of exclusive humanism. Our times and
context have produced several cross-pressures and
dilemmas. Taylor openly wonders whether a
closed moral framework provides sufficient depth
of meaning to navigate our contemporary
situation. When we encounter new life, death,
suffering, or any number of other momentous
events, does exclusive humanism have the spiritual
resources necessary to help us discern meaning?
Does it have the moral depth we need to sustain
the life of benevolence we moderns prize? Our
need for meaning and moral orientation has not
abated, but the resources at hand have dwindled.
Taylor affirms, “The issue about meaning is a
central preoccupation of our age, and its
threatened lack fragilizes all the narratives of
modernity by which we live.”27
This is where the work of Jesuit education
rightfully begins. The drive for meaning remains,
and in many ways has intensified in modern times.
The great luxury of living in an enchanted age is
that meaning was provided for you; it was woven
into the fabric of the cosmos. Now, not only are
there several fragmented systems of meaning from
which to choose, each individual is expected to
piece together and express an entirely unique self.
We draw on the social imaginaries that surround
us, but are forbidden from admitting any authority

beyond our internal intuition. Not even theistic
believers are free from these tensions.
Taylor summarizes many of these insights in The
Ethics of Authenticity, declaring that authenticity has
become for westerners the ultimate good and
virtue – the hypergood of contemporary western
society.28 This much, to Taylor, is unavoidable.
Yet, against the “booster” and “knocker” arguing
over the proper place of authenticity in society,
Taylor suggests that the more fruitful discussion
concerns what type of authenticity we seek:
What we ought to be doing is fighting
over the meaning of authenticity, and
from the standpoint developed here, we
ought to be trying to persuade people that
self-fulfilment [sic], so far from excluding
unconditional relationships and moral
demands beyond the self, actually requires
these in some form. The struggle ought
not be over authenticity, for or against, but
about it, defining its proper meaning. We
ought to be trying to lift the culture back
up, closer to its motivating ideal.29
The search for authentic fullness is a common
struggle across contemporary moral frameworks.
Jesuit education has the opportunity to meet
people in this quest and help them to develop a
vocabulary that reinterprets their lives in more
meaningful ways.30 Regardless of religious
affiliation, there is merit in challenging anyone to
be more articulate about the goods that shape
their identity. Indeed, Taylor’s Sources of the Self
offers a blueprint for engaging others on not just
faith, but broader questions of how we imagine
human flourishing. Rather than a broadside
inquiry into one’s constitutive good, the
conversation can begin around any number of
strong evaluations. For Taylor it is these strong
evaluations begin to form our identity by
distinguishing those elements that are of greater
importance. Conversations around life goods can
in turn lead to deeper sharing about the
hypergoods and constitutive good of one’s life.
Jesuit education could begin not with a broadside
attack on science and secularism, but by simply
inquiring what it is that another values and desires.
Taylor concludes A Secular Age by speculating how
one can break free from the immanent frame and
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open his or her horizon to the transcendent. To
Taylor, this amounts to a conversion in the
deepest sense of the term. He highlights several
individuals who discovered something beyond the
immanent frame; or more accurately, were pulled
from it. This suggests that in the end, the work is
beyond human efforts. Nevertheless, there is a
clear path forward for engaging believers and
unbelievers alike. It would be impossible to revert
to earlier times, and Taylor refuses to discount the
good that modernity has brought forth. The
critical question is not how to escape or overcome
our secular age, but rather, how to cultivate
meaningful lives within it. This is a task that we all
share. Our success or failure will largely depend
on how we understand and frame the issue.
Secularism is not merely a question about what
exists, but what we value; and what we value
determines who we are. We must engage in
sincere conversations about how we imagine
authentic flourishing and how it is realized in our
lives.
Fostering Magnanimity and a Ruined Life
It is here that I believe the sociologist Christian
Smith, most famous for identifying the de facto
faith of contemporary adolescents as Moralistic
Therapeutic Deism, becomes an interesting
conversation partner with Taylor. Smith’s book
Lost in Transition identifies key challenges facing
college-aged emerging adults today.31 The first and
apparently fundamental problem in Smith’s
perspective is the moral drift, confusion, and
inarticulacy that he and his collaborators identified
in their interviews. When challenged to describe a
situation that required a difficult discernment of
right or wrong, or to articulate their moral code,
most participants were unable to provide any clear
response. Moreover, though they affirmed that
some actions and behaviors are always wrong,
participants could not identify what it was that
made them so. The emerging adults that Smith
interviewed struggled to name their sources of
morality, relying instead on trust in their moral
intuitions and gut reactions.
What Smith sees as a foundational challenge for
emerging adults is not such a dire situation from
Taylor’s perspective. For Taylor, it is natural for
our moral evaluations and frameworks to exist in
an inarticulate and unreflective way. Most young

adults dwell within social worlds in which these
basic assumptions are seldom challenged or
engaged; an insight that developmental
psychologists have recognized for decades. While
they do not have the readily accessible
propositions that a catechism once provided, it is
unlikely that early twenty-year-olds were ever able
to articulate the sort of moral sophistication Smith
seems to expect.
A far more compelling portrayal of the
contemporary obstacles to belief (at least from
Taylor’s perspective) appears in Smith’s following
discussion on consumerism. Though it was not his
primary concern, the questions that are asked in
this chapter are quite revealing through the lens of
identity and the good. In interviews, Smith and
colleagues ask participants to describe the goals
and aspirations toward which they strive: what
they picture as the good life. What is surprising
about most responses is their banality. Few
participants offered any desires beyond a
comfortable existence: “A family, a nice car, nice
house, my own practice, be happy, stuff like
that.”32 The exceptional few hope for extravagant
wealth or fame, but most are content with simply
enough to comfortably survive and provide for
loved ones. What their responses lacked was any
vision of a larger purpose to existence. In both the
social and spiritual realms, participants could not
imagine a vision of fullness or flourishing beyond
unproblematic subsistence. Nor were there any
great causes for which it was worth sacrificing
their own well-being.
This places any discussion of moral and spiritual
belief in a new light. Regardless of what
theological convictions emerging adults profess,
the truth is that most imagine a life in which little
is asked of God, and little is required in return – a
sort of functional secularism. The visions of the
good life that animate our students are greatly
impoverished. It is not simply that they are failing
to envisage the fullness of the reign of God; their
imaginations do not extend beyond their own
domestic tranquility. We are witnessing, to use
Taylor’s categories, the triumph of ordinary life.
Nevertheless, emerging adults have not lost their
esteem for universal compassion and human
rights. Their social media timelines are filled with
articles, videos, and petitions rallying for or against
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any number of pressing social concerns. Indeed,
their rejection of organized religion is often
articulated in opposition to what they perceive as
hypocrisy and intolerance rampant within the
institution. Yet most prefer that their social
engagement remain at a safe distance – never
willing to risk too much to realize their ideals. The
degree to which “slacktivism” should be
celebrated or lamented remains an active debate,
and cannot be resolved here. But the trend itself is
very telling. We want to see the end of violence
and poverty but don’t want it to get in the way of
us enjoying a night out with friends now and a
secure life in the future.
This tension between functional secularism and
limitless social concern provides a unique lens
through which to view justice education at Jesuit
colleges and universities. Most often, moral
commitments are treated as secondary to
ontological claims. It is assumed that only after
theoretical principles are established can we begin
to discuss their practical consequences. Yet
Taylor’s insights suggest just the reverse. It is our
moral experiences – our struggles to articulate and
realize our moral ideals – that lead us to
investigate deeper ontological beliefs. Establishing
the theoretical possibility or likelihood of a
personal deity does little to engage the more
fundamental questions of selfhood. As long as
students comfortably remain in the functional
secularism that Christian Smith seems to identify,
in which human flourishing requires no contact
with the transcendent, any investigation into the
content of faith will remain an abstract curiosity
with little impact on one’s lived identity. What can
educating for justice offer in such a situation?
In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle offers a brief
discussion on the virtue of magnanimity –
greatness of soul.33 Aquinas subsequently develops
this virtue through a Christian lens.34 Magnanimity
provides an apt description of what is missing in
the moral imagination of many today: the belief
that one is capable and worthy of great things.
Education for justice at its best does not rely
solely on outrage at suffering or cold calculations
of fairness; rather it enlivens one’s sense of worth
and potential. It presents a vision of human
flourishing that is open to experiences of both
community and transcendence. It engages and
forces us to articulate (in Taylor’s categories) the

strong evaluations and constitutive goods that
form our identity. By studying the lives of moral
exemplars, students examine their own
commitments and the sources that sustain them.
Experiential service-learning programs pull us out
of our daily routines and offer a glimpse of human
fullness that goes beyond quiet productivity and
consumption. Without indoctrination, educating
for justice has the potential to break through our
individualistic and secular frames.35
I would like to offer an example from my past
work with the Jesuit Volunteer Corps. Decades
ago, Jack Morris, the Jesuit frequently credited
with founding the organization, would throw his
hands up in mock disgust whenever he would
learn of a volunteer abandoning past aspirations
for a successful corporate career so that she could
dedicate herself to serving her neighbor. “Ah!” he
would lament, “another one, ruined for life!” This
phrase soon captured the imaginations of others
engaged in the work and became JVC’s unofficial
motto. Still today, potential volunteers are drawn
by this sense of becoming ruined – the uneasy
awareness that there is more to life than what we
are usually promised. It has become its own vision
of fullness.
Yet it is only after months of struggling to realize
the ideals expressed in JVC’s four values of
community, spirituality, simplicity, and justice that
volunteers begin to acknowledge that their own
efforts are not enough to sustain their work; that
they need to engage some moral and spiritual
source beyond themselves. For some this means a
return to the traditions and devotions of their
youth, while others seek new paths and practices
that better fit their values and needs. Theistic
belief has never been a requirement for Jesuit
volunteers, just the willingness to explore and
question. Proselytism has never been the goal,
though a sort of conversion inevitably occurs. The
experience of striving to realize our highest ideals
and aspirations, and repeatedly falling short, forces
us to acknowledge and engage our moral sources
in a way that theoretical conversation alone never
could.
This is the power and promise of service-learning
and educating for justice. The Catholic social
tradition carries with it a vision of the person in
society and in creation that resonates with even
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the most closed and secular modern frameworks.
In so doing, it invites students to recognize and
name their own vision of fullness – as well as the
moral sources that animate and sustain it. It
fosters a greatness of soul – the belief that we are
capable and worthy of more in life. Between
learning about the tradition and being formed in
the identity (between docere and tradere), there is a
host of ways in which students can learn from the
church’s social tradition and articulate their own
vision of fullness in conversation with it.
Educating a Justice That Does Faith
How, specifically, might Taylor’s insights inform
justice education on Jesuit campuses? To return to
the moral framework that he articulates in Sources
of the Self, it begins with engaging the life goods
and strong evaluations to which our students are
already committed. While they may profess a
staunch relativism, they make decisions each day
about what constitutes a meaningful and
flourishing human life. Indeed even this relativism
is rooted in moral ideals of tolerance, diversity,
and authenticity. One need not immediately
launch into an investigation of students’ religious
identity or faith commitments. Rather, following
Ignatius’s maxim of entering through their door,
we might begin to engage students by simply
inquiring where their passions lie, and what
aspects of their life constitute their sense of self.
This may be as simple as their extracurricular
activities or the social and political issues about
which they are concerned. It is often these simple
conversations that expand to the most profound
ones. From basic life goods the dialogue might
eventually expand to how a student manages
conflicts between goals and commitments or
prioritizes life goals.
Deepening conversations may aim toward the
hypergoods that orient a student’s sense of self:
how do they weigh the multiple demands on their
time and energy? What priorities do they want to
cultivate during their studies and beyond?
Students often need help in naming and
articulating these foundational ideals, yet are
relieved to at least have these tensions
acknowledged. Once they are named, the
conversation can turn toward what it takes to
sustain their higher values over a lifetime. This
might include a community of support and

practices of renewal that empower the student to
continue the journey. While the conversation may
never lead to committed religious faith, it does tap
into the student’s deepest moral and spiritual
sources. Of course, a conversation like this takes
time and develops slowly (if at all).
There are many ways that service-learning and
experiential education can aid this process. It is
often far too easy for students to remain
comfortably in familiar surroundings (the
infamous “campus bubble”) and never test their
moral commitments and buffered selves. Lighting
the spark of magnanimity often requires a direct
and personal encounter. Concerns about the
merits of short-term volunteer and immersion
experiences are nothing new. In 1968 Ivan Illich
proclaimed “to hell with good intentions” and
implored would-be volunteers to opt out of
“mission-vacations” that could only do more
harm than good.36 Whether immersion programs
are worth the resources they require remains an
active debate.37 There is also a growing body of
literature questioning traditional models of
service-learning courses and highlighting the ways
in which student volunteers can be a greater
burden than benefit to local nonprofit agencies.38
As a mechanism for delivering newly painted walls
to impoverished populations, short-term
volunteering is indeed inefficient at best. Yet there
remains no comparable way to offer students
glimpses of a fullness that surpasses their moral
imagination. It is this fullness rooted in solidarity
that invites students to more deeply reflect on
their own goals and narratives.
What students are to do with the highs that they
experience through these encounters is not always
thoughtfully developed. While we promise
ourselves that we will never forget those we
encounter and the lessons we learn, we inevitably
do. Often, students resolve to replicate the
experience by taking more trips or seeking even
more extreme frontiers. A more promising avenue
is trying to translate these heightened experiences
into sustained moral commitments – work that is
exceedingly more difficult. This is where a justice
that does faith takes root.
As a hypothetical, it is easy to believe that we can
sustain and act upon our moral commitments; and
we indeed may – for a while. Yet the full weight of
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our moral ideals is only realized when we begin to
experience the struggles, setbacks, and failures that
accompany any march toward justice. A weeklong immersion experience rarely leaves us ruined
for life, no matter how much we may feel it at the
time. Even semester-long service-learning courses
are not always enough to challenge students to tap
into their moral and spiritual reserves. I have
taught courses in which school breaks and snow
days piled up to the point that students begin
saying goodbye before they ever truly felt settled.
While I do not deny the benefits of these courses,
I am convinced that engaging the deeper roots of
a student’s identity takes more time than we are
usually allowed.
Over the past two years I have had the good
fortune to teach sections of Boston College’s
PULSE: Person and Social Responsibility. In this
year-long, twelve credit hour course, students
satisfy their core philosophical and theological
requirements while volunteering ten to twelve
hours per week with a local nonprofit agency. This
program remains the finest example that I have
encountered in practice or literature. The high
demand that it places on students is essential to its
success (and, it is worth noting, only seems to add
to its appeal). Within the first few days of fall
semester I warn my students that there will
inevitably come a time in which it will get tough
and they’ll be ready to quit. Yet, it is usually not
until February or March that this dire prediction
comes to pass. Only after their friends have lost all
interest in their service, a New England winter has
knocked out public transportation, and they
realize that their best efforts have made almost no
difference in the lives of those they serve do
students begin to ask if they truly have what it
takes to remain committed to their lofty ideals.
It is at this moment that two deeply interrelated
conversations can begin in earnest. The first
concerns the social and spiritual resources that
empower them in their work: when do they feel
burnout and how do they respond? How do they
renew themselves to continue in the struggle? Is
there a community from which they draw
support? The second conversations looks ahead,
inviting vocational discernment about how the
needs and struggles they witness intersect with
their own passions, talents, and goals. It has been
my experience that feelings of accomplishment are

inversely related to the amount of time spent in
service. It is easy to congratulate ourselves for a
week of intensive service. The longer students
struggle and fail to make a difference at their
partnering agencies, the more deeply the realize
that a commitment to justice will require their
entire lives.
If, as they soon discover, a year of service does
not save the world, what will? It is easy to slip into
despair at these moments, but there is an
alternative. From Taylor’s perspective, we make
meaning of our lives through the stories we tell
about the goods and Good toward which we
strive. Purely speculative reasoning about the good
life or the existence of a good God may help to
sharpen our arguments, but it rarely taps into
these core narratives. Yet once an authentic
encounter with the Other activates these values,
students soon recognize that their entire lives are
at stake. For Taylor, the question of identity is one
of orientation, not arrival. Fullness is only
experienced in glimpses, and reassurance is found
not in the knowledge that we have accomplished
our goal, but simply that we are on a meaningful
path. As students reimagine themselves as women
and men who walk and struggle in solidarity,
success is defined by simply remaining on the
path. On a journey so perilous, we soon discover
that we cannot walk alone.
Conclusion
This perspective and dynamic casts the link
between the service of faith and the promotion of
justice in a new light. Forty years ago, the 32nd
General Congregation challenged all of us to
recognize the demands of justice that are implicit
in our faith commitments. Increasingly today the
direction has shifted. Justice, not faith, is the
natural point of departure. Our students continue
to negotiate their identities in conversation with
those goods that they find valuable and
worthwhile. These include the values of universal
solidarity and human dignity that are essential to
our modern moral order. Yet sustained action on
these ideals is impossible without drawing upon
our deeper moral and spiritual resources.
Our students will only realize this for themselves
when they are given the opportunities to put their
social principles into action. As long as our moral
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debates take place within the safe confines of the
classroom or message board, they will never
engage one’s deeper sources of meaning and
value. Justice and peace education is not a
secondary theological activity. It is not up to the
scripture scholars and systematicians to articulate a
theological vision that justice educators translate
in concrete social contexts and political actions.
Rather, it is by struggling to find the words to
make sense of our experiences of fullness that we
are compelled to engage our theological traditions.
If we have no sense of this fullness, we will have
little need of theological language.
It is likely a revelation to very few that theological
education today, particularly justice and peace
education, does more than teach moral principles
and intellectual speculation. More frequently, it
invites students to bring concrete experiences into
conversation with their own values and moral
traditions – to engage in the work of practical
theology. Learning to articulate and investigate our
moral ideals in conversation with concrete social
realities serves an essential dimension of every
human life. Still today in our secular age, these
questions of meaning and identity remain
inescapable – even when our vision of fullness
begins to look a lot like a ruined life.
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